The world should be more paranoid about a Taiwan invasion threat

An assessment of the Taiwan invasion threat and blind spots in existing scenarios

Taiwan has 14 undersea cables connecting it to the rest of the world

Over the last few weeks, the Boyd Institute has built a collective intelligence node for the China-Taiwan threat. We’ve read books, reviewed scenarios, and created a group chat on Signal where we’ve debated when an invasion would occur, what form it would take, and whether it would happen at all.

We’ve interviewed domain experts, held spaces on X, and attended lectures at DC think tanks. We’ve followed China’s daily ADIZ violations and other happenings through open-source intelligence resources. I summarized some of the resources I’ve found helpful here.

Assessment Summary

So what is my assessment? Rather, what is my current assessment, since it will continue to evolve?

Speaking for myself only, my assessment is that there’s a 20% chance China makes a move to annex Taiwan over the next two years and a 30% chance it makes a move within the Davidson Window, meaning by the end of 2027.

These odds may seem low at first, but they are alarmingly high considering what is at stake — namely, tanking the world economy, the end of Pax Americana, and the possible start of World War Three. A 20-30% chance of a catalyzing event at this scale is something to take very seriously. The U.S. and allies should be much more paranoid about the Chinese invasion threat than we are today.

Base Case

My base case (70 or 80% likely) is that China will not attempt an annexation. First of all, it’s risky and, even if successful, the costs would be extremely high. Taiwan's terrain is mountainous and has few landing-beach options, which are well-defended. The population values independence, which was reaffirmed in Taiwan’s recent election.

Secondly, the U.S. is implicitly obligated to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack under the Taiwan Relations Act. President Biden has stated that U.S.’s forces would defend Taiwan multiple times during his presidency. This is a major deterrent.

Thirdly, it’s not clear the Chinese military is up to the task. Unlike the U.S. military, the PLA hasn’t seen action since 1979. It still lacks key capabilities and operational excellence, though it is rapidly catching up and recently upped its annual defense spending by 7.2%.

Thus, my base assumption is that China will continue its “boil the frog” strategy of gradual gray-zone escalation. The Chinese military and its affiliates will walk right up to the line of direct military confrontation with Taiwan and others, and then keep pushing it until it blurs.

In the short time I’ve looked at this, it’s been wild to watch China ratchet up its daily sea and air aggression in real-time, as they have in recent months and years. For a good view on this daily activity, follow Ben Lewis on X and read his February 26th oped in the New York Times, “China is Running Out of Lines to Cross in the Taiwan Strait.”

I would expect China’s saber rattling to continue over the next two months through the inauguration of Taiwans’ new president Lai Ching-te in late May. April and October are the months when the Taiwan Strait conditions are relatively good, so I would take special care to monitor activities leading up to these windows of time.

China’s supersonic reconnaissance drone, the WZ-8

Annexation Case

If China makes a move to annex Taiwan (20-30% probability), my sense is that it would follow some sort of incident where China gets Taiwan to jump offsides. This might look like Taiwan shooting down a Chinese airplane that goes into Taiwan's air space. The point is that China would seek some pretext to justify an annexation attempt and rally its population around it.

The annexation action could take any number of forms, including a blockade, full-scale invasion, attack on an outlying island, or an air and missile strike — or some combination of these. My best guess is that it would involve rapid missile & cyber attacks combined with a digital & full blockade aimed at quickly strong-arming Taiwan to discuss unification. I think they would optimize for speed over mass, trying to achieve full-spectrum dominance very quickly. China might use new asymmetric offensive technology and attempt to pull it off without an amphibious invasion, but I don’t think it can be done without an invasion and, in any case, an invasion force would be needed to make the threat credible. Thus, troop mobilization and logistics indicators would likely be detected in advance of such an action by U.S. intelligence, though China would still do its best to optimize for speed and surprise. It is possible China would strike U.S. bases in the region to cripple our ability to respond, though that would risk stiffening the U.S.’s resolve from China’s perspective.

Making a move to annex Taiwan would be risky and, even if successful, the cost would be very high. Xi is more conflict-avoidant and passive-aggressive than, say, Putin. Then again, Xi has been clear about his intent to “reunify” China. He expressed this directly to Biden at the APEC conference and again in his New Year’s address.

With the U.S. election this year, and our focus spread thin across different theaters, Xi may perceive 2024-2025 as an auspicious window of opportunity to finally fulfill the One China policy. At age 70 and in his third term, he may feel pressure to complete the reunification in order to seal his position as China’s greatest leader since Mao. The problem is, this would backfire massively if it did not work. He would want to be sure. So again, I give the odds 20% over the next two years and 30% through 2027. It is a meaningful risk and should be taken seriously.

U.S. Blind Spots & Considerations

Every Taiwan scenario I’ve seen focuses on military action on Taiwan. But the military is just one instrument of power that China would employ, and Taiwan isn’t the only center of gravity for activity. Indeed, the vulnerability no one seems to seriously address is U.S. political decision-making. Breaking the American "will to fight" or to defend Taiwan through diplomatic coercion, economic pressure, psychological measures, systems disruption, and a looming threat of WWIII is where my red-team mind focuses. The U.S. has had a dress rehearsal for this with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; we’ve seen the efforts to not support Ukraine and the geopolitical ramifications of jammed political decision-making. China’s economic leverage is much stronger than Russia’s and could be used to break or weaken the U.S.’s will to support Taiwan over the long haul. There’s a gap between elite consensus to defend Taiwan and the public will to do so. This is exploitable and requires more thought and action. Imagine someone asking the average American, Would you be willing to fight and die for Taiwan? Would you be willing to nuke the global economy and U.S. stock market to protect Taiwan?

The U.S. will to defend Taiwan depends, in part, on Taiwan’s will to defend itself. But here is another blind spot. Taiwan spends less on defense as a % of GDP than the U.S. does and far less than similarly vulnerable nations like Israel. Much as Taiwan likes to portray itself as a fortress island, it is not quite as strong and prepared as it could be. I say this respectfully as someone who admires Taiwan and believes the U.S. could learn a lot from it.

The psychological terrain of Taiwan is a key factor. For a snapshot, take a look at this Pew report from January 2024. I would think that the psychology of Taiwan’s military and reserves is something to carefully monitor and manage.

Regarding the semiconductor industry, Taiwan faces a conundrum. It recognizes the need to offshore critical operations, but the more it does so the less of an economic incentive there is for the U.S. and others to protect it. Regardless, developing contingency plans for TSMC and other critical companies is needed if these do not already exist.

Over the long term, I don’t see how the U.S. can sustain a credible deterrence without putting our defense industrial base on wartime footing, as this CSIS report advises. The fact that China has 232x our shipbuilding capacity, and there’s no consensus or urgency to modernize policy and build capacity, reveals another major blind spot as well as a general lack of seriousness.

Finally, there’s a scarier scenario people rarely talk about where China would launch a full-scale attack on the U.S. first, aiming to cripple our air and naval capabilities at zero hour. Think: a Pearl Harbor-level surprise but led by drones and cyberattacks. So this is something to consider as well.

Conclusion

Geopolitics is intensifying across the world. Some would say we are in a deniable state of World War III if not a new cold war. An attempt by China to invade or annex Taiwan would be a catalyzing event at a global scale. It is the singular event most likely to unleash World War III and, if successful, to mark the official end of Pax Americana. The U.S., Taiwan, and allies must do everything we can to deter it and prepare for it. We cannot allow our resources and attention to be spread too thin. Nor can we allow wobbliness in our strategic resolve. We have to cover the downside risk while managing China’s ongoing gray-zone escalation, and we cannot do this alone.

I understand that, with everything happening in the world right now, it is easy to focus on flash points in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. But we must not get distracted from the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. and allies need to be much more paranoid than we are today about an attempted annexation and our will to defend Taiwan, and ourselves, over the long haul.